

STATINTL

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## *Dope And The CIA*

The publishing firm of Harper & Row is to be commended for its rejection of Central Intelligence Agency criticism of a book on the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia which it plans to release this month. The author, Alfred W. McCoy, alleges that some American officials and CIA agents have allied themselves with groups engaged in the drug traffic, have abetted the traffic by covering up for drug runners and have been involved "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA, which has undertaken an unusual publicity campaign to throw down the charges (some of which have been published previously), asked Harper's for permission to examine the advance text. The firm complied, and received a long CIA criticism of the book. Harper & Row editors went over the comments with Mr. McCoy, examined his substantiating documents, and then informed the agency it saw no reason to make any changes in the book.

B. Brook Thomas, Harper & Row vice president and general counsel, said the publishers were "underwhelmed" by the CIA critique. He added that the CIA had been very courteous and correct—"We haven't got any pressure."

We would consider the very request by the CIA to be a form of pressure, however, and Harper & Row was well-advised to resist it.

Mr. McCoy makes a strong case for the charge that CIA policies have in fact aided the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. This has come about through the agency's free-wheeling clandestine efforts to control events in remote areas of Indochina. If the CIA would stick to intelligence gathering it would not be subject to such charges as Mr. McCoy has leveled, and would not have to defend itself.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH  
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# editorials:

## From Bangkok To The West

One of the persistent scandals of the demoralizing war in Indochina is the growth of the illicit Asian narcotics traffic of which Americans are the principal victims and for which the United States Government must assume all too much of the blame. The situation is so tragic, and so blatant, that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has voted to cut off all aid to Thailand until its government moves to curb the export of opium.

The measure on which the committee voted was offered by Representatives Wolff of New York and Steele of Connecticut who have visited Thailand and who think that, to put it mildly, the Thais are not doing enough to stop the trade in opium. The substance reaches the United States in the form of heroin; Mr. Wolff says that as much as five tons of heroin, enough to supply the entire addict population of the U.S., leaves Thailand annually.

Of course Thailand is supposed to be a United States "ally" and is increasingly the seat of United States air power as American forces are withdrawn from Vietnam, and that is part of the trouble. Mr. Wolff has said that high-ranking Thai officials are involved in the drug traffic, and he has noted that while opium also comes from Cambodia and Laos these two countries do not have the ability to control it as Thailand does.

The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious. The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of

the CIA's secret army in northeastern Laos. American diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts.

The United States has seven big air bases in Thailand. They have been absorbing units from Vietnam as efforts are made to comply with President Nixon's troop withdrawal schedules. One base, Nam Phong, is closer to Hanoi than the Da Nang airbase in South Vietnam which recently lost all its remaining fighter squadrons to bases in Thailand. The present announced total of U.S. military strength in South Vietnam, 54,000, does not include 42,000 men on naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and 50,000 airmen in Thailand and Guam.

So the U. S. presence in Thailand actually is growing and so is the opportunity for corrupt Thai officials to exploit the situation and develop the drug traffic. Bangkok has long been a center of activity in such international commodities as gold and jewels, and Mr. Wolff says that 11 trawlers now openly transport heroin and opium from Bangkok to Hong Kong. Presumably this comes from northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the so-called Golden Triangle, and it could not be moved without official connivance.

We feel sure the Thais, who have an authoritarian government, could crack down on this dirty business if they had a mind to, and the United States ought to exert maximum pressure. The idea of cutting off military assistance can at least be clearly understood by the pragmatic Thais.

25 April 1972

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## Enough Of Covert Action

While the Administration has obtained a temporary order against publication of a book on the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful to the author. He has already provided outside of book covers some valuable insights and comments on an agency that deliberately hides from the public and Congress.

Without revealing any really hidden secrets, the author uses published reports to note that the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dollars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency has 18,000 employees, and that 6000 of these are working in clandestine services, as opposed to intelligence collection.

As it is, however, the CIA is the President's baby. Congress has proposed various control measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, or requirements for clearer information about it, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Congress as well as the White House. Congress, after all, foots the bill, but it does not know for what.

CIA officials occasionally surface from secrecy to complain that critics concentrate on CIA failures. If so, that is because the public only hears about the failures, and they have to be big ones at that. They always seem to involve those covert or "paramilitary" operations, which range from a most qualified success in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I don't think we've had a successful paramilitary operation yet."

The clandestine operations are worth review. There was the U-2 spy plane incident that torpedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. There was the CIA's proud armed intervention to "save" Guatemala from leftists, leaving the country to oppression and terrorism. There was

the financing of Radio Free Europe which, when disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige of freedom or credibility. And there was the Bay of Pigs.

Then there was the CIA military operation to save the Dominican Republic from a rebellion to return a democratically-elected president. There was armed support for the overturn of a government in The Congo. Of course, there was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening the way for another dictatorship more satisfactory to Washington. And there is presently war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered without any visible success for the American position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace and order.

Aside from the fact that so many of these clandestine activities were inefficient and ineffective, even aside from the fact that they were bound to be failures for America's long-range prospects and reputation even if they did succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in paramilitary functions represents a continuing ability to start hostilities without the knowledge of the people or Congress, and certainly without any declaration of war.

Author Marchetti is fair enough to say that so far various presidents have kept a measure of control over such activities. That is no guarantee for the future, however, and it is Congress, not the President, that is supposed to make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Marchetti recommends confining intelligence activities to a small and highly professional group, and eliminating the covert actions entirely.

Intelligence simply cannot work well when governed by an agency equally interested in activities ranging from propaganda to military action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation does need successful intelligence. It does not need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable power to make war.

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12 April 1972

## ***Bring The CIA To Heel***

Although Congress in the foreign aid authorization bill signed earlier this year imposed some controls over the Central Intelligence Agency, the free wheeling CIA still operates without much accountability to the legislative branch of government. Its budget remains secret. And only last month a study by the General Accounting revealed that Agency for International Development funds intended for public health use in Laos were being diverted to the CIA for use in the guerrilla war in that country.

The record of CIA disdain for the will of Congress underscores the importance of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would oblige the agency to provide congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security. Two former CIA officials, Dr. Herbert Scoville and Chester L. Cooper, testifying for the bill, said the agency should provide Congress with the same analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

At present CIA briefings of Congress are provided only as sanctioned by the White House. Since Congress also has authority in foreign relations and military affairs, there is justification for giving the legislators access to CIA data. Indeed, its machinations in the military and political affairs of other countries suggest that it has arrogated to itself so many improper policy-making initiatives that the agency should be either be abolished or restricted by law to intelligence gathering alone.

1 2 JUL 1971

### *To Curb Secret Warmakers*

Distasteful as it may be, the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends to some degree upon the quality and quantity of information it is able to accumulate about the military plans and capabilities of potential adversaries. But a broad chasm separates the business of espionage and those of diplomatic maneuvering or military operations and it is its routine disregard of this essential division that has prompted critics both in and out of Government to question the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. ✓

As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA reportedly meddles in domestic affairs of other countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up a "sympathetic" government there—activities which are conducted with neither public mandate nor knowledge. The CIA even wages war on what can only be presumed to be largely its own initiative. Some 5000 Thai troops under CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country whose neutrality this Government ostensibly respects. ✓

Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent the CIA from financing military operations without congressional authorization. Mr. Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making "end runs around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments," which prohibit the use of American ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the use of Pentagon funds to provide military support to the governments of those nations. ✓

The case for the measure, however, is not confined to our clandestine activities in Indochina, for there is no justification for the CIA to carry out military operations anywhere without congressional approval. The CIA budget, estimated to be as much as a billion dollars, is hidden among the routine budgets of various federal agencies. Espionage funds may well have to be kept under cover but Congress must insist that the CIA confine its activities to gathering information and not expand them to the point of making war.

10 June 1971

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## Cut Off The Funds For Laos

If it seems irregular in a democracy to convene a secret session of the Senate to discuss United States involvement in a secret war in Laos, it is. But there may be some justification for the former if not the latter. Senator Symington of Missouri has been engaged in a commendable effort to bring the Laotian situation to public notice, and arranging for a closed-door meeting is a good way to attract attention.

Mr. Symington says that in the three-hour session he passed on to other Senators a report by two staff members of a Foreign Relations subcommittee disclosing that what is happening in Laos is "quite a bit different from what we had known was going on." The report is to be made public as soon as it is declassified by Government agencies, Mr. Symington says.

We rather imagine that if the document is ever published it will not reveal many secrets, for the Administration has made every effort to prevent the American people from finding out what the United States is up to in Laos. One reason apparently is that the United States is breaking the Geneva peace accords (so are the North Vietnamese) and does not want to advertise it.

It is more than that. A *Washington Star* correspondent in Vientiane quoted a top American diplomat as saying recently, "What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society. We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society can't tolerate that."

Mr. Symington pointed out it is generally understood that the U.S. is supporting some 4800 Thai mercenaries in Laos; the Central Intelligence Agency has been revealed as back-

ing an indigenous Laotian army of unsavory repute. Just how much money these and other activities are costing is not known to the public.

The Senator notes that the only publicly announced cost of U.S. involvement is \$52,000,000 a year for economic assistance. Senator Case of New Jersey said after the secret session that expenditures appeared to be about \$250,000,000 a year, not including the huge cost of regularly bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos. The *Washington Star* correspondent reported the defense of Laos is costing Washington 2 billion dollars a year.

Whatever the figure is, it is far too high. Mr. Symington wants to limit the expenditures to \$200,000,000 annually, exclusive of the bombing costs. Why should the Senate approve spending anything at all for a clandestine war, one patently conducted in contravention of the Fulbright amendment prohibiting this sort of expenditure in Laos or Cambodia?

We think Senator Symington would do better to press for a cutoff of all military funds. Mr. Case says, "If we are involved in this, as we obviously are, how do we get out?" We get out simply by turning off the water. We have no business in Laos, and the proof of our wrongful involvement is the effort to keep it secret.

The American people ought to be given all the facts on Laos, not just the fraction interested Government agencies can be counted on to dole out. If what we are doing in Laos is inconsistent with our kind of society, let that be known and then let it be stopped. Let the Senate take a stand against any more funds for Laos.

STATINT

### *Incredible*

The House has voted by a whopping 298 to 75 to give its Internal Security Committee (formerly Un-American Activities Committee) a record \$570,000 budget. The vote also rejects an Administration Committee proposal that the sum be held to the previous record high of only \$450,000. This means the Internal Security Committee will receive more than many of the traditional standing committees of Congress but, of course, Chairman Ichord of Missouri assured members that the group needed the funds to investigate whether Communists directed recent antiwar demonstrations.

Thirty years ago the committee was investigating whether Communists directed appeals for better welfare payments and New Deal legislation. Today, the suspects naturally include those who want peace in the world, civil rights at home, or anything else worth demonstrating for. Representative Drinan of Massachusetts, a Roman Catholic priest and member of the committee, says such suspects add 700,000 names of individuals or groups to the committee files.

Considering total appropriations for the subversive-hunters through the years, the expenditure comes to something like \$13 a name. It is a small sum, perhaps, to guarantee the nation against the threat posed by some worthy causes. What with the Ichord committee, the CIA, the FBI, and the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force, not to mention the Secret Service, many Americans will sleep better knowing they are safer from subversion. ✓

20 April 1971

## The Honorable Men Of The CIA

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Last week Richard Helms in his first public speech since his 1966 appointment as director of the Central Intelligence Agency tried to counter what he characterized as a "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency." He attributed the criticism to an "inherent American distaste for peacetime gathering of intelligence," and told his audience that the nation must "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

If Mr. Helms's analysis of information gathered abroad is as incomplete and misleading as his interpretation of what prompts criticism of his agency here at home, then the country is clearly in trouble. It is not the intelligence gathering aspect of the CIA's operations that has fed the growing body of criticism. What the critics object to are covert paramilitary operations around the globe, and they question whether the secrecy that is admittedly required for some aspects of intelligence gathering should be extended to cover a host of questionable and frequently illegal activities under the pretext of serving an undefined "national interest."

In the years since it has become active in covert operations the CIA has financed the invasions of two countries, Cuba and Guatemala, and otherwise influenced the establishment and overthrow of governments in a number of lands, including Vietnam. It provided planes and mercenary pilots to the Congo (some of the same men it trained to invade Cuba) and for several years it has financed and directed a mercenary army in Laos in violation of our treaty commitments. At the same time it has engaged in activities that have more to do with propaganda than intelligence. It has subsidized magazines and publishing companies and the operation of radio

stations which free advertising in this country portrayed as supported by private donations.

In addition there have been instances in recent years when the agency has apparently been successful in establishing for itself a place above the law. Two examples are the dismissal of a slander suit against an agent on the ground that, even though his statements were not substantiated, he was acting under orders, and the case of the Green Berets accused by the Army of murdering a suspected Vietnamese double agent, but never brought to trial because the CIA refused to supply witnesses.

Even assuming that Mr. Helms is correct in his contention that the agency functions under the tight control of the President, an assumption which many knowledgeable critics dispute, the fact remains that the agency's activities have evaded the checks provided by the Constitution and in doing so it has deceived the American people. The issue, then, is not whether the men in charge of the CIA are devoted, or even honorable, and faith is not the answer to such fundamental criticism. It was faith in the efficacy of covert military and political manipulation, after all, that propelled us into our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia.

What is needed is a check on the presidential fascination with Mr. Helms's "Department of Dirty Tricks," a fascination that has pervaded the past four administrations. Congress is the appropriate body to provide that check, even though at present it is not doing so. The supervision now supplied by a handful of key members of Congress is, in the words of a recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "only sporadic and largely *ex post facto*." Fortunately there are efforts now underway to strengthen congressional overview of the CIA. These efforts deserve the support of the American people.